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Notes
Statutory Protection of the Other Mother:
Legally Recognizing the Relationship
Between the Nonbiological Lesbian
Parent and Her Child
by
ELIZABETH A. DELANEY*
"No human bond is cemented with greater strength
than that of parent and child."'
Within the last eighteen months, the California Court of Appeal has
decided two important family law cases that will have far reaching effect
on the lives of nontraditional families throughout the State. The court
held in Curiale v. Reagan2 and Nancy S. v. Michele G. 3 that only the
biological or adoptive mother has the status of "legal parent" when a
lesbian couple decides to have a family and raise a child. The biological
mother's lesbian partner is not considered a legal parent of the child that
the couple raises together because she does not have a biological or adop-
tive link to the child.4 These cases demonstrate that without the status of
"legal parent" the lesbian partner will have virtually no success pursuing
child custody and visitation actions if her relationship with the biological
mother ends.5
The formation of nontraditional families by gay couples is dramati-
cally on the rise.6 Child custody and visitation lawsuits inevitably result
* Member, Third Year Class; B.S. 1985, Northeastern University.
1. Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 357, 703 P.2d 88, 89, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748,
749 (1985).
2. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990).
3. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991).
4. Id. at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215; Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at
522.
5. See, ag., Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 837, 838, 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216, 217-18;
Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
6. Most recently, one commentator has observed, "At least 1.5 million, perhaps 4 mil-
lion children nationwide are being raised by gay or lesbian couples. Many were born of prior
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when these couples terminate their relationships.' Because the California
courts have reached divergent outcomes in dealing with such cases,8 the
California legislature must settle this area of family law. In order to en-
sure fair and consistent results upon which lesbian couples9 can rely
when planning a family, legal recognition of both parents is necessary.10
heterosexual unions, but about 10,000 babies have been conceived via donor insemination".
Leslie Dreyfous, "Divorced" Lesbians and Gays Challenging Legal Definition of a Parent, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1991, at A39. By an earlier count, "Approximately three million gay men and
lesbians in the United States are parents, and between eight and ten million children are raised
in gay or lesbian households." Note, Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the
Law, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1508, 1629 (1989) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (citing ABA
Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law Experts, 13 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1512, 1513
(1987)). Regardless of their exact number, such nontraditional families are becoming increas-
ingly common. See also Elena M. DiLapi, Lesbian Mothers and the Motherhood Hierarchy, 18
J. HOMOSEXUALITY Nos. 1/2 1989, 2+ 101, 103-04 (1989) (estimating that a 43% increase
occurred between 1970 and 1980 in families with no man present, that traditional two parent
families composed only 36% of households in 1980, that there were over 2 million lesbian
mothers in the United States in 1982, and that 1.5 million children were living with lesbian
mothers as of 1985); E. Donald Shapiro & Lisa Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact of
Birth Innovations upon Traditional Family Notions, 24 J. FAm. L. 271, 278-79 (1985-86)
(describing the increasing interest of lesbian and gay communities in creating biologically re-
lated families); Jane Gross, New Challenge of Youth: Growing Up in Gay Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1991, at Al ("There have always been homosexuals who became mothers or fathers in
conventional marriages and then reared their children after divorce. But now, more and more,
gay men and lesbians are doing it the other way around-first acknowledging their homosexu-
ality and then setting out to form families."); David Margolick, Lesbian Child-Custody Cases
Test Frontiers of Family Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990, § 1, at 1, 10 (estimating that at least
10,000 children are now being reared by gay women).
7. See Margolick, supra note 6, at 1, 10.
8. Compare Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (holding that
nonparent in same-sex relationship had no standing to assert claim for custody or visitation)
with Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (holding that, while the court
had subject matter jurisdiction, the lesbian partner's status did not entitle her to grant of cus-
tody) and Sabol v. Bowling, No. CF27024 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Jan. 30,
1989) (permitting nonbiological mother's action for joint custody based on the principles of
equitable estoppel) and Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 21, Loftin v. Flournoy, No.
569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County., Sept. 4, 1984) (holding nonbiological mother had
standing to assert visitation rights under California's principles of "general custody law").
9. This Note focuses on the rights of lesbian parents. Through artificial insemination
lesbian women have the option of creating families without bestowing any legal rights upon the
sperm donor. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983) (treating sperm donor "in law as if he
were not the natural father." (emphasis added)). A homosexual male couple, however, needs
the assistance of a woman in order to give birth to a child that is biologically linked to one of
the men. The addition of a third party in the homosexual male couple scenario raises addi-
tional considerations because the child-bearing woman may have legal rights with respect to
the child. See, eg., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 109 N.J. 396 (1988). Analysis of the legal
rights pertaining to homosexual male families is beyond the scope of this Note.
10. Two commentators recently observed:
If you're a gay or lesbian couple and you want to raise a child, you face a major
practical problem: in almost all cases, only one of you'll have the legal rights of a
parent. Why? Because only one of you can be the biological parent, or, if you adopt
or foster a child, usually only married couples or single people can adopt or become
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The benefits of legally and socially recognizing the nonbiological as well
as the biological parent would include: legal protection in the areas of
child custody and visitation rights;11 protection of the child's economic
interests; 12 and protection of the child's psychological well-being.
13
This Note discusses the legal bases for a nonbiological lesbian parent
to obtain standing to sue for child custody and visitation rights. Part I
explores recent California decisions that have refused to expand the defi-
nition of parent beyond the precise statutory language of the Uniform
Parentage Act. Part II examines the existing, yet ineffective, strategies
proposed in California by nonbiological, nonadoptive parents in same-sex
relationships and explains why the California statutory scheme is a bar-
rier to their success. It compares California's legislation with other
states' statutory schemes, which promote more equitable results than
those reached by California courts. Part III discusses the need to expand
the definition of parent and family in California. The author proposes
that the California legislature adopt a broadened definition of legal par-
ent to include a nonbiological, unmarried "parent" who has satisfied cer-
tain conditions, even though no biological or adoptive link connects the
child to that "parent." She further recommends that the California legis-
lature enact a "second parent" adoption statute. These statutory modifi-
cations would produce fair and foreseeable results by allowing qualified
nonbiological parents to pursue child custody and visitation actions with-
foster parents. No matter how strong the bonding between the child and the other
parent, or "co-parent," the role isn't legally recognized.
HAYDEN CURRY & DENIS CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 7:2
(5th ed. 1989). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 6, at 1655 (noting that "co-
parent" may lose custody of child to legal parent in case of a break-up, or to relatives of
biological parent in case of death).
11. Legal recognition of the relationship would allow standing for the lesbian partner to
pursue child custody and visitation actions and would place the lesbian partner on equal foot-
ing with the biological or adoptive parent.
12. By legally recognizing the parent-child relationship, the legislature also would protect
the child's future economic interests in child support payments, inheritance rights, social se-
curity benefits, and insurance policy benefits.
13. One group of commentators has observed that decisionmakers
have been slow to understand and to acknowledge the necessity of safeguarding a
child's psychological well-being. While they make the interests of a child paramount
over all other claims when his physical well-being is in jeopardy, they subordinate,
often intentionally, his psychological well-being to, for example, an adult's right to
assert a biological tie. Yet both well-beings are equally important, and any sharp
distinction between them is artificial.
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4 (1973). These
commentators further contend: "Continuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmen-
tal influence are essential for a child's normal development. Since they do not play the same
role in later life, their importance is often underrated by the adult world." Id. at 31-32. There
appears to be no reason why these reflections upon the importance of continuity in parental
relationships should hold any less true merely because a parent is a lesbian and not biologically
linked to the child.
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out unduly extending such standing to unqualified third parties. Fur-
thermore, these changes would place lesbian partners on equal footing
with the natural or adoptive mother by providing them with equal access
to the judicial system as well as equal rights to custody of and visitation
with their children.
I. The California Courts' Refusal to Expand the
Definition of Parent
In recent months the California Court of Appeal twice has been
presented with the issue of whether a lesbian partner can be considered a
legal parent for purposes of pursuing child custody and visitation actions
when she is neither the biological nor adoptive mother of the child.14
The court's answer to this quandary has been a resounding "no." 15 In
both Curiale v. Reagan and Nancy S. v. Michele G. the court refused to
expand the current definition of legal parent to include these lesbian part-
ners and instead deferred such expansion to the California Legislature. 16
A. The Curiale Decision
The California Third District Court of Appeal recently held in Curi-
ale v. Reagan, 17 that the plaintiff did not have standing to assert a cus-
tody or visitation claim against the child's natural mother.1 ' The
plaintiff, Angela Curiale, and defendant, Robin Reagan, had a live-in re-
lationship from April 1982 until December 1987. Prior to moving in
together, the couple discussed the possibility of co-parenting a child. 19
They agreed that Reagan would conceive a child via artificial insemina-
tion and that they would both share the responsibilities of raising the
child.20 They further agreed that Reagan would stay at home for two to
three years with the child and that Curiale would support the family.
The child was born in June 1985. Curiale provided the sole financial
support for herself, Reagan, the child, and another child of Reagan's
from an earlier relationship. Curiale, however, was neither the natural
mother, stepmother, nor adoptive mother of the newborn child.
14. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991); Curiale v.
Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990).
15. See Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215; Curiale, 222 Cal. App.
3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
16. Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 219; Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at
1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
17. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520.
18. Id. at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
19. Appellant's Appendix in Lieu of Clerk's Transcript at 12, Curiale (No. C006346)
(Declaration of Angela Curiale in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause).
20. Id. at 1 (Complaint to Establish De Facto Parent Status/Maternity and for Custody
and Visitation).
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The couple's relationship ended in December 1987 and Curiale
moved out of the household.21 The two women entered into a written
agreement in which they agreed that both of them would continue to
share the physical custody of the child and that Curiale would continue
to support Reagan and the child with monthly payments of approxi-
mately $4,000.22 In June 1988 Reagan terminated Curiale's child cus-
tody and visitation rights.23
Curiale filed a complaint to establish de facto parent status/mater-
nity24 and for custody and visitation.25 The trial court granted the de-
fendant's motion to quash the order to show cause and dismissed the
complaint on the basis that the plaintiff had no standing to initiate the
proceeding. 26 The California Court of Appeal affirmed. 27
The Court of Appeal held that Curiale, as a nonbiological parent in
a same-sex relationship, had no standing to appear before the court.
Curiale had attempted to bring an action under California Civil Code
section 7015, part of the Uniform Parentage Act,28 to determine that a
parent-child relationship existed between herself and the child.29 Section
7015 provides, "Any interested party may bring an action to determine
the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. 30
Curiale argued that section 7015 afforded her standing as "any interested
party." The court firmly rejected this argument, holding that Civil Code
section 7015 did not apply to a case in which the identity of the child's
natural mother was undisputed.31 In so holding, the court strictly ad-
hered to the language of California Civil Code sections 7001 and 7003,
which limit the definition of parent to those who are either the natural or
the adoptive parents of the child.32 Because it was undisputed that the
child's biological mother was Reagan, the court reasoned that Curiale's
claim was not within section 7015 because the child could not have two
mothers.
21. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
22. Appellant's Appendix in Lieu of Clerk's Transcript at 1-2, Curiale (No. C006346).
23. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Curiale (No. C006346).
24. See infra Part II.A. (discussing de facto parenthood).
25. Curiale 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
26. Id. at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
27. Id. at 1601, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
28. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983); see 10 B.E. Wrrc'TKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL-
IFORNIA LAW § 409 (9th ed. 1989).
29. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
30. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7015.
31. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1599-1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
32. Section 7001 defines the parent-child relationship as "the legal relationship existing
between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or im-
poses rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship
and the father and child relationship." CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001 (emphasis added). Section
7003 provides the methods for establishing the existence of this relationship:
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The court also rejected Curiale's attempt to institute a child custody
action under California Civil Code section 4600.3 3 Section 4600 pro-
vides, "In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor
child, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any
time thereafter, make such order for the custody of the child during mi-
nority as may seem necessary or proper."' 34 The court held that section
4600 alone does not create subject matter jurisdiction.35 In so holding,
the court clearly articulated the currently accepted statutory interpreta-
tion of section 4600: section 4600 grants the courts authority to issue
custody orders only if there is an underlying proceeding before the
court.
36
In California the underlying proceedings generally can be catego-
rized into one of the three major bodies of law involving child custody
decisions: 37 guardianship, 38 juvenile dependency,3 9 and "general cus-
The parent and child relationship may be established as follows:
(1) Between a child and the natural mother it may be established by proof of
her having given birth to the child, or under this part.
(2) Between a child and the natural father it may be established under this part.
(3) Between a child and an adoptive parent it may be established by proof of
adoption.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003. For the purposes of this note, biological parent and natural parent
are used interchangeably.
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983). Civil Code § 4600 is part of the Family Law
Act which was enacted in 1969. The Family Law Act, ch. 1608, § 8, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314,
3330 (operative Jan. 1, 1970). See In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 693, 694-95, 523 P.2d 244, 253,
255, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 453, 455 (1974) (For a child's custody to be awarded to a nonbiologi-
cal parent under § 4600, "[a] court [is] required to render a finding that an award to [a biologi-
cal] parent would be 'detrimental to the child' and that such an award to a nonparent [is]
'required to serve the best interests of the child.' ')' (quoting § 4600). The legislature's primary
goal in using the "detrimental to the child" language in Civil Code § 4600(c) was to curtail the
power of the court to award custody of a child to a nonparent over the parent. 10 WrIuN,
supra note 28, §§ 116-17. The legislature was attempting to avoid the poor results exemplified
by Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966). In
Painter, an Iowa court awarded custody to the grandparents over the natural father because of
disapproval of the father's "Bohemian" lifestyle even though the father was employed, remar-
ried, relatively successful and would have provided a stable environment. Id. at 1392, 140
N.W.2d at 154. See also Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption
Law and Proposalsfor Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 10, 23-28 (1975) (discussing the
legislative intent and impact of the Family Law Act); Everette M. Porter & Joseph F. Walsh,
The Evolution of California's Child Custody Laws: A Question of Statutory Interpretation, 7 Sw.
U. L. REv. 1, 10-27 (1975) (discussing the legislative history of § 4600).
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a).
35. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
36. Id.
37. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings - Problems of
California Law, 23 STAN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1971).
38. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1500 (West 1991). A guardian has the care, custody, and con-
trol of a child during its minority. Id § 2351. When appointing a guardian over a minor,
courts have held that "the right of [legal] parents to retain custody of a child is fundamental,
and may be disturbed '... only in extreme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatable
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tody" law.40 "General custody" law most frequently applies to custody
disputes during divorce proceedings.41 In addition, other recognized
proceedings that provide jurisdiction for the adjudication of custody is-
sues include:42 adoption,43 determination of maternity44 or paternity,
45
proceedings to terminate parental rights,46 and habeas corpus actions.47
As the Curiale court noted in its decision, however, Curiale could
not rely on any of these proceedings to obtain standing to claim custody
or visitation rights.48 Curiale did not seek relief by proceedings for
guardianship or termination of parental rights because she intended to
seek joint custody and visitation, not to divest Reagan of her parental
rights. Juvenile dependency proceedings involve a claim that the biologi-
cal parent is unfit,49 which Curiale was not alleging. As the unmarried
same-sex partner of the biological parent, divorce proceedings could not
apply because two people of the same sex cannot marry in California.
50
with parenthood.'" Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 419, 188 Cal. Rptr.
781, 788 (1983) (quoting In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 489, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627, 579
P.2d 514, 518 (1978)).
39. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991). To declare a minor a
dependent child of the court, a petition must be filed with the court. Id. § 325. The legislative
intent behind § 300 is to provide maximum protection for children who are in some way being
harmed or are at risk of being harmed. These harms include, inter alia, neglect, sexual or
physical abuse, and serious emotional damage as a result of the parent. "[This] protection
shall focus on the preservation of the family whenever possible." Id. § 300.
40. Bodenheimer, supra note 37, at 704.
41. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 4350 (West 1983). When married couples with chil-
dren divorce, the underlying marriage dissolution proceeding provides jurisdiction for the ad-
judication of child custody and visitation issues.
42. See generally Bodenheimer, supra note 37, at 704-05 (discussing at least eight separate
proceedings in California that provide jurisdiction for the adjudication of child custody issues).
43. CAL. CIv. CODE § 221.10 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (providing for the adoption of
any unmarried minor child by any adult person, subject to further rules prescribed in the
adoption chapter).
44. Id. § 7015 (West 1983) (providing that "[alny interested party may bring an action to
determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship").
45. Id. § 7006 (West 1983) (allowing a child, a biological mother, or a man presumed to
be the child's father to bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a father-
child relationship).
46. Id. §§ 232-233 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). Any interested person may petition the
court for an order to declare a minor child free from custody and control of its legal parents.
Id. § 233. A state agency usually commences the proceeding, supplanting the authority of the
legal parents due to their alledged inability to care properly for the child. In re Jacqueline H.,
21 Cal. 3d 170, 175, 577 P.2d 683, 686, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (1978). For the parents, an
adverse judgement in the proceeding leads to a permanent severance of the parent-child rela-
tionship. bId
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1507 (West 1982) (writ of habeas corpus can be utilized by a
person who is entitled to custody of a child to regain custody of such child from another party
who is not legally entitled to custody).
48. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 1599-1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (1990).
49. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
50. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983). The California legislature has defined marriage
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Additionally, under current California law, the lesbian partner cannot
adopt the child unless the biological parent of the same gender consents
and relinquishes her own parental rights. 5 ' Finally, the current legal def-
inition of parent in California denied Curiale standing to pursue either a
habeas corpus proceeding or an action to determine maternity.5 2 There-
fore, under California Civil Code section 4600, a nonbiological parent in
a same-sex relationship currently is unable to seek child custody unless
she attempts to fully divest the biological parent of all her parental rights
through a guardianship proceeding or a proceeding to terminate parental
rights.
B. The Nancy S. Decision
In early 1991 the California First District Court of Appeal in Nancy
S. v. Michele G.53 also addressed the issue of whether a lesbian partner
who was neither biologically nor adoptively linked to a child could be
considered a parent of that child within the meaning of the Uniform Par-
entage Act. The court held that the status of the lesbian partner as a
parent-like figure did not entitle her to a grant of custody. 54 Nancy S.
and Michele G. moved in together in 1969 and later that year partici-
pated in a private marriage ceremony. After mutually deciding to raise a
family together, Nancy S. was artificially inseminated. A daughter, born
in 1980, was given Michele G.'s family name and Michele G. was listed
on the birth certificate as the father. Four years later, by the same
method, Nancy S. bore a son.
In 1985 Nancy S. and Michele G. separated. An agreement was
reached in which one child would live with Nancy S. and the other child
with Michele G. In addition, the couple arranged a visitation schedule
providing for the children to be together four days a week at either
Nancy S.'s or Michele G.'s home. This arrangement lasted three years
until Nancy S., the birth mother, tried to initiate a new arrangement
as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to which the
consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary." Id California law used
to describe marriage as a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between two con-
senting persons. The law was amended in 1977 to clarify that marriage is a contract between a
man and a woman. Act of August 17, 1977, ch. 339, § 1, 1977 Cal. Stat. 1295 (amending CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4100). This amendment created a legal barrier to same-sex couples entering into
a lawfully recognized marriage contract.
51. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 221.20, 222.76, 221.70 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). On rare occa-
sions, however, California courts have waived certain statutory provisions to allow joint adop-
tions by same-sex couples and to allow the lesbian partner to adopt the biological mother's
child without divesting the biological mother of her legal rights. See infra notes 236-239 and
accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussing how Curiale failed to fit the
statutory description of legal parent, a requisite for either a maternity or habeas corpus action).
53. 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991).
54. Id. at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
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wherein each parent would have custody of both children fifty percent of
the time. Michele G. resisted this change. As a result, Nancy S. filed a
proceeding under the Uniform Parentage Act for a declaration that Mi-
chele G., her former lesbian partner, was not a parent of Ms. S.'s off-
spring.5 5 Nancy S. further requested a declaration that, as the natural
mother, she was entitled to sole legal and physical custody of the chil-
dren and that Michele G. was entitled to visitation only upon her con-
sent. Michele G. cross-complained for custody and visitation,
acknowledging that Nancy S. was the birth mother but alleging that she
too was a parent of the children. The trial court found in favor of the
natural mother. Because Ms. G. did not conform to the statutory defini-
tion of parent, the trial court reasoned that it did not have jurisdiction to
award her custody or visitation over the objection of the children's bio-
logical parent.56 Ms. G. appealed.
The California Court of Appeal held that the lower court had juris-
diction under the Uniform Parentage Act to decide whether Ms. G. was
a parent of the children. 57 The appellate court acknowledged that the
Curiale court had characterized such a situation as a problem of lack of
standing and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 58 In reaching the merits
of the Nancy S. case, the court held that jurisdiction is lacking only when
a court has no power to adjudicate the subject in dispute.59 Since "appel-
lant [Michele G.] has always maintained the position that she was a par-
ent of the child and therefore was entitled to custody and visitation," the
court reasoned that the lower court had jurisdiction under the Uniform
Parentage Act to determine whether Ms. G. was a parent.6° The court
never addressed the standing issue. After determining that it had subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the claims, the court then addressed the mer-
its of Michele G.'s cross-complaint. Because Michele G. did not dispute
that she was neither the children's natural nor adoptive parent, the court
of appeal concluded that the trial court correctly determined that Mi-
chele G. could not establish a parent-child relationship under the Uni-
form Parentage Act.61 Michele G. argued, however, that the Uniform
Parentage Act did not provide the only definition of parent. Instead,
relying on several legal theories, she argued that she had acquired "pa-
55. Id. at 834, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
56. Id. at 835 n.2, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215 n.2.
57. Id
58. Id. Actually, the Curiale court had held that Civil Code section 7015 was inapplica-
ble in cases where it was undisputed who was the natural mother. The court further held that
since Civil Code section 4600 does not create subject matter jurisdiction, jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate custody depends upon an underlying proceeding before the court. Because Curiale had no
standing to pursue any underlying proceeding, she had no means of pursuing a child custody
or visitation action.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
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rental rights" to seek custody of and visitation with the children. 62 Fur-
thermore, Michele G. contended, these "parental rights" enabled her to
seek custody and visitation on equal footing with the natural mother, as
if the dispute was between two legally recognized parents.
The court of appeal analyzed each theory at length, but ultimately
determined that these alternatives did not provide Michele G. with status
equal to that of a legal parent.63 The court emphasized the importance of
deference to the legislature "in matters involving complex social and pol-
icy ramifications far beyond the facts" of the instant case.64
C. Reconciling Curiale and Nancy S.
While the factual situations and final outcomes of Nancy S. and
Curiale are similar, the courts' handling of the standing issue provides a
notable legal distinction. In Nancy S. the court concluded that it had
subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Parentage Act to deter-
mine the parental status of the former lesbian partner. In contrast, the
Curiale court held that the Uniform Parentage Act was inapplicable. In-
stead, the court held that since Civil Code section 4600 did not provide
independent subject matter jurisdiction, Curiale was without recourse to
pursue a child custody or visitation action because she had no standing to
avail herself of the necessary underlying proceeding. The cases can pos-
sibly be reconciled on the ground that, in Curiale the nonbiological les-
bian parent instituted the action to determine parentage,65 while in
Nancy S. the biological mother filed the action for a declaration that the
lesbian partner was not the children's parent. 66 Since Nancy S. was the
children's legally recognized parent, she had standing to pursue her ac-
tion declaring Michele G. a nonparent under section 7015. This action
was an underlying proceeding for section 4600 purposes. Curiale, how-
ever, by not fulfilling the definition of a legal parent, was unable to pur-
62. Michele G. proposed the legal theories of: de facto parenthood, in loco parentis,
parenthood by equitable estoppel, and equitable parenthood. Id. at 836, 838-40, 279 Cal.
Rptr. at 216-18.
63. Id. at 841, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The court held that the theory of de facto
parenthood did not confer upon Michele G. the same rights as a legal parent to seek child
custody and visitation. Id. at 837, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. The court dismissed the use of the
theory of in locoparentis, refusing to extend the concept to give a nonparent the same rights as
a legal parent in seeking child custody and visitation. Id at 838, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217. Since
the doctrine of parenthood by equitable estoppel is rooted in the presumption that a child born
to a married women is a child of the marriage, the court rejected the use of the theory since the
presumption did not apply in the instant case. Id at 839-40, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19. Fi-
nally, the court, citing an earlier California case, refused to adopt the concept of equitable
parenthood due to the "'complex practical, social and constitutional ramification'" such an
expansion would entail. Id at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
64. Id. at 841, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
65. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 1599, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521 (1990).
66. Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 834, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
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sue an action to determine the existence of a parent-child relationship
under the Uniform Parentage Act. Lacking standing to pursue any un-
derlying proceeding, Curiale was unable to pursue her child custody and
visitation claims under California Civil Code section 4600. Thus, current
California precedent permits only the biological mother to institute an
action challenging the parental status of the nonbiological lesbian part-
ner. After Curiale, the lesbian partner is unable to assert her own action
to determine the existence of a parent-child relationship under Section
7015. Civil Code section 4600 is thus also of no use, because the nonbio-
logical partner lacks standing to pursue the requisite underlying proceed-
ing. This result appears particularly unfair because it allows one party
access to the judicial process while denying a similarly situated party the
same rights.
Under Curiale and Nancy S., even if a court addresses a lesbian part-
ner's claims for child custody and visitation, the lesbian partner's paren-
tal status is not commensurate with that of the natural or adoptive
mother. In short, the California Court of Appeal refuses to recognize
these lesbian partners as legal parents without a biological or adoptive
link to the child. The legacy of Curiale and Nancy S. is disheartening:
children who have been raised by two loving parents will be denied the
opportunity to maintain a close relationship with the nonbiological par-
ent, if the legally recognized parent so desires.
II. The Battle to Acquire Legal Parent Status
Child custody and visitation is a crucial issue that must be resolved
after the termination of a same-sex couples' relationship. The most
widely recognized theories that nonbiological parents use in their attempt
to gain standing to fight for these child custody and visitation rights are
de facto parenthood, standing in loco parentis, and equitable parenthood.
These theories also are asserted by lesbian partners brought into court by
the biological mother. The lesbian partner claims her status as either a
de facto parent, a person standing in loco parentis, or equitable parent
entitles her to seek custody and visitation on equal footing with the chil-
dren's natural mother.
While sometimes used interchangeably, these three theories differ in
that they are rooted in various aspects of law and psychology. De facto
parenthood is derived from psychological parenthood 67 and has histori-
cally been used by foster parents to intervene in dependency hearings. 68
The theory of in loco parentis developed in the context of torts, "to im-
pose upon persons 'standing in loco parentis' the same rights and obliga-
67. See infra note 73; GOLDSTEIN et al., supra note 13, at 17.
68. Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 837, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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tions imposed by statutory and common law."' 69 Equitable parenthood is
based in the theories of equitable estoppel and equitable adoption.70
The success of each theory depends primarily on two factors: the
state courts' interpretation of the statutory definition of "parent"; and
the state's individual statutory scheme, which determines whether a
nonparent can initiate a custody suit without an underlying proceeding
already before the court.
The following discussion illustrates the interplay between different
states' judicial decisions, statutory schemes, and theories of parenthood.
California's results are compared with results in other states. The discus-
sion recognizes that lesbian women often are left without legal recourse
because their relationships and families lack the legal protection of
marriage.
A. De Facto Parenthood
De facto is a phrase used to characterize a situation which is some-
how defective for reasons of form, but which must be accepted for all
practical purposes.71 De facto parenthood describes a parent-child rela-
tionship that, though illegitimate for failure to conform to certain proce-
dural rules, for all intents and purposes exists in fact if not in law.72
Parties who fall outside the statutory definition of legal parent, but who
consider themselves to be a child's parent, frequently allege de facto
parenthood in actions involving child custody and visitation.
(1) California
A de facto parent consistently has been defined in California as "a
person who, on a day-to-day basis, assumes the role of parent, seeking to
fulfill both the child's physical needs and his psychological need for affec-
tion and care."73 In California, the first documented case granting cus-
69. Id. at 838, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
70. See infra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
71. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 375 (5th ed. 1979).
72. See, e.g., Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836-37, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (discussing de
facto parent status in the context of custody rights).
73. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 692 n.18, 523 P.2d 224, 253 n.18, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 453
n.18 (1974) (seminal case frequently cited regarding definition of de facto parent); see also
CAL. R. CT. 1401(a)(4) (1991) (defining de facto parent as "a person who has been found by
the court to have assumed, on a day to day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child's
physical and psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a
substantial period"); GOLDSTEIN et al., supra note 13, at 17, 19, 98 (using similar language to
define psychological parents). See generally In re Joshuia S., 205 Cal. App. 3d 119, 122, 252
Cal. Rptr. 106, 107 (1988) (holding that de facto parent status confers standing in dependency
hearings); Christina K. v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1467, 229 Cal. Rptr. 564,
566-67 (1986) (determining foster parent's status as de facto parent by reference to quality of
relationship with child); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 397, 224 Cal. Rptr.
530, 537 (1986) (biological mother asking court to declare her friend de facto parent of the
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tody to a de facto parent over the biological parent was the 1933 case of
Guardianship of Shannon.74 Shannon involved a custody dispute be-
tween a natural mother and a stepmother for guardianship of two minor
children. The trial court appointed the stepmother as guardian, finding
that the natural mother "was not a fit, proper, and competent person to
be appointed guardian" of her children.75 The reviewing court affirmed.
In deciding to award the children to the stepmother, the court took sev-
eral factors into consideration: the children looked upon the stepmother
as their mother; the children did not have a close relationship with their
natural mother; the children did not want to be separated from their
younger half-sister; and removing the children from the stepmother
"would mean breaking up an established family and placing said children
with a mother who has had little contact with them for five years or
more."'
76
Since Shannon, California courts consistently have recognized the
theory of de facto parenthood in traditional child custody proceeding. 77
Although recognizing the theory, the courts have been unwilling to
equate de facto parenthood with legal parenthood. 7 The refusal to rec-
ognize de facto parenthood as fulfilling the statutory definition of legal
parent causes two major difficulties. First, recognition of de facto parent
status alone will not confer standing for purposes of a child custody pro-
ceeding.79 In all reported California cases in which de facto parenthood
has been alleged successfully, there have been underlying proceedings
that gave the nonbiological parents standing to present their case for cus-
tody.80 An unmarried lesbian partner who is neither the natural nor
child); Charles S. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 151, 156, 214 Cal. Rptr. 47, 50 (1985)
(holding that grandfather was de facto parent); Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d
407, 420-21, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 789-90 (1983) (holding plaintiffs had become child's de facto
parents); Perez v. Department of Health, 71 Cal. App. 3d 923, 927, 138 Cal. Rptr. 32, 34
(1977) (holding that grandmother and uncle, as de facto parents, were proper parties to pater-
nity proceedings).
74. 218 Cal. 490 23 P.2d 1020 (1933).
75. Id at 491, 23 P.2d at 1021.
76. Id at 493, 23 P.2d at 1021-22; see also, In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 692, 523 P.2d 244,
253, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 453 (1974). The B.G. court observed:
The fact of biological parenthood may incline an adult to feel a strong concern for
the welfare of his child, but it is not an essential condition; a person who assumes the
role of parent, raising the child in his own home, may in time acquire an interest in
the "companionship, care, custody and management" of that child. The interest of
the "de facto parent" is a substantial one, recognized by the decision of this court in
Guardianship of Shannon and by courts of other jurisdictions and deserving of legal
protection.
Id (footnotes and citations omitted).
77. See supra note 73 (collecting cases).
78. See infra note 85 (collecting cases).
79. See supra notes 24-53 and accompanying text (discussing Curiale decision).
80. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 831, 834, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (1991)
(biological mother's action for declaration that lesbian partner was not a parent of children
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adoptive mother of the child will not have access to necessary underlying
proceedings which provide standing.81 Without an underlying proceed-
ing, the nonbiological parent is powerless to get into court to present her
evidence. Consequently, the theory of de facto parenthood offers no re-
lief to a lesbian partner who, having neither a biological nor an adoptive
link to the child, seeks standing to assert custody over the child of a
longterm relationship. 2
The second difficulty stemming from the courts' refusal to equate de
facto and legal parent status is that recognition of de facto parent status
will not place the lesbian partner on equal footing with the natural or
adoptive mother. In Nancy S. v. Michele G., the court acknowledged
that Michele G. might be entitled to status as a de facto parent.8 3 How-
ever, the appellate court specifically held that, even though a lesbian
partner may be granted de facto parent status, this status does not entitle
her to "the same rights as a parent to seek custody and visitation over the
objection of the children's natural mother. ' 84 Furthermore, the court
noted that no cases supported the contention that de facto parents can
seek custody according to the same standards that are utilized in a dis-
pute between two legal parents.8 5 The de facto parent must show by
provided underlying proceeding for lesbian partner to allege de facto parent status); Jhordan
C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 397, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537 (1986) (court determined
that declaration of de facto parent status to female friend of biological mother during proceed-
ing initiated by semen donor to establish paternity and visitation rights was premature); In re
Batey, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1356 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987) (awarding child custody and
guardianship to nonbiological "parent" who was homosexual partner of deceased biological
father over claims of child's biological mother during guardianship proceedings). But cf Loftin
v. Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County, Sept. 4, 1984), cited in Shapiro
& Schultz, supra note 6, at 271 (ordering that nonbiological lesbian partner had right to seek
visitation with child whom she and her companion were raising at the time of their separa-
tion). Judge Agretellis of the Alameda Superior Court held that "Miss Loftin has standing to
pursue her request for visitation under what I find to be the general custody law of this state."
Shapiro & Schultz, supra note 6, at 274 n.15 (citing Loftin). The judge went on to add that
even though no case or statute directly provided Loftin with this right, it was "embedded in
statutes and cases." Id. Although the author applauds Judge Agretellis' interpretation of Cali-
fornia's general custody law, in light of the court of appeal opinions in Curiale and Nancy S. it
must be admitted that Loftin is of no precedential value.
81. See Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 1599-1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 520-22
(1990).
82. See infra notes 228-235 and accompanying text (discussing adoption difficulties for
same-sex couples where one of the parents is the biological parent).
83. Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 837, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
84. IA
85. Id.; see also In re Jody R., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1615, 1627-28, 267 Cal. Rptr. 746, 754
(1990) (holding that de facto parent's role in dependency hearings is limited and that de facto
parent is not considered a parent or guardian for purposes of dependency law); In re Venus B.,
222 Cal. App. 3d 931, 935, 272 Cal. Rptr. 115, 117 (1990) (distinguishing between a de facto
parent and a stepfather for purposes of California Welfare and Institutions Code § 362(c)); In
re Joshuia S., 205 Cal. App. 3d 119, 122, 252 Cal. Rptr. 106, 107 (1988) (holding grant of de
facto parent status does not automatically confer custody, but rather confers standing to allow
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clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to the chil-
dren for the children to remain in the custody of the natural parent. 86
This "detriment" standard is much more rigorous than the "necessary or
proper" standard which is applied in a dispute between two legal
parents. 87
The above discussion explains the reasons why de facto parenthood
has failed in California as an alternative parental theory for lesbian part-
ners. De facto parent status is neither an effective method of gaining
standing to pursue child custody and visitation actions nor a means to
gain equal footing with the legally recognized parent once the dispute is
before the court.
(2) De Facto Parenthood in Other States
In other states the use and effectiveness of the de facto parent theory
has varied, primarily because other state statutes differ and, as a result, so
do the respective state courts' interpretations of their respective provi-
sions. The earliest case to award child custody to a de facto parent in a
same-sex relationship was the 1977 Colorado case of In re Hatzpoulos.88
In Hatzpoulos the child's biological mother committed suicide, and the
state instituted a dependency-neglect proceeding. The state's proceeding
gave the mother's partner standing to allege de facto parent status.89
Although this case is notable because it recognized the lesbian partner as
a de facto parent and subsequently granted custody to the lesbian part-
ner,9° courts are likely to limit Hatzpoulos to its facts.91 Furthermore,
assertion of their interest in custody, companionship, care, and management of the child); In re
Jamie G., 196 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683-84, 241 Cal. Rptr. 869, 875 (1987) (holding de facto
mother had no due process right to reunification services statutorily accorded to natural par-
ents, adoptive parents, and guardians in dependency hearings), cert denied, 488 U.S. 835
(1988).
86. Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 837, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. California Civil Code
§ 4600(c) provides:
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other
than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that an
award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West 1983).
87. Thus, in proceedings between two parents "where there is at issue the custody of a
minor child, the court may ... make such order for the custody of the child during minority as
may seem necessary orproper." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (emphasis added).
88. 4 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 2075 (Colo. Juv. Ct. 1977).
89. Id.
90. See also In re Pearlman, 15 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1355 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1989). In Pearl-
man, a lesbian couple lived together in a monogamous relationship for 13 years, during which
time they decided to bear a child through artificial insemination. After the biological mother
died, the child lived with her grandparents while the lesbian partner as de facto parent had
state-awarded rights of visitation. However, unbeknownst to her, the grandparents instituted
adoption proceedings, adopted the child, and then filed for abolition of the de facto parent's
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Hatzpoulos (in which the biological mother was dead) is distinguishable
from cases in which the nonbiological lesbian parent requests custody
over the objections of the biological mother.
In a recent Maryland decision, A.C.C. v. C.LD.,92 the court granted
visitation rights to the nonbiological lesbian parent of a seven year-old
child.93 The lesbian couple had lived together for four years before de-
ciding to parent a child together through artificial insemination. To-
gether they chose a suitable sperm donor. After the child was born, they
remained together for four years, after which time the couple separated.
The nonbiological parent frequently visited the child for two years after
the separation, until the child's natural mother prohibited any further
visitation. The nonbiological parent then sued for joint custody and visi-
tation in 1989. The natural mother expressed the fear that, if the court
granted the plaintiff any rights at all, it would open the door for babysit-
ters, teachers, and friends to ask for the same rights.94 In granting the
plaintiff visitation rights, the court reasoned that even though the plain-
tiff was not a "parent," a "significant relationship" existed and the child's
best interests supported a continuation of that relationship.95 The plain-
tiff, while not receiving recognition as a legal parent, was able to main-
tain her relationship with the child through visitation. However, if the
judge had determined that the plaintiff was a legal parent of the child, the
issue of custody would also have been addressed. The case appears to
limit the definition of legal parent to a biological or adoptive parent, but
acknowledges the existence of a "significant relationship" between the
child and the nonbiological parent important enough to grant visitation
rights.
A different result, although employing a similar limitation upon the
definition of legal parent, was reached in the Wisconsin case of In re
visitation rights. The court held that, while the Florida adoption statute did not expressly
require notice to anyone other than the child's natural parents, since the de facto mother had
state-awarded visitation rights entitling her to temporary custody, she had a constitutionally
protected interest in preserving her family relationship with the child that could not be termi-
nated without notice. The court then awarded legal and physical custody of the child to the
lesbian partner. Id. at 1355-56.
91. As Paula Ettelbrick, Legal Director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc., has noted, "In instances in which the biological mother has died, courts seem to be more
sympathetic and willing to award custody to the surviving non-biological mother." 7 LAMBDA
UPDATE, Winter 1990, at 15.
92. No. 89191039/CE 99919 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct. March 29, 1990), noted in
Margolick, supra note 6, at 10.
93. Id.
94. It
95. The judge apparently arrived at her decision after consulting with the child in the
judge's chambers. Id. Fortunately, the child was mature enough to articulate her feelings and
convey her desire to continue the relationship with her nonbiological parent.
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ZJ.H. 96 There, a lesbian nonbiological parent sought custody and visita-
tion of her former partner's adopted son. The plaintiff based her action
on de facto parenthood.97 The Wisconsin Circuit Court held that the
action fell outside the court's statutory authority, which regulated judi-
cial awards of child custody, placement, and visitation.98 The court fur-
ther held that it lacked the authority to enforce a contract between the
parties providing for mediation in case of a custody/visitation dispute,
because the contract violated the legislative intent of the statute.99
Affirming the circuit court's decision, the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peal concluded that the adoptive mother was the child's sole parent, and
that statutory language referring to "minor child of the parties" did not
include a de facto parent "even when that person has established a close
parent-like relationship with the child." 1 ° The court also held that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of the visitation statute, which
provides petition options for a person who has maintained a parent-child
relationship with the child, did not apply when the family unit was intact
and when no underlying action had been fied.101
The varying results obtained in these out-of-state cases depend en-
tirely upon the individual state's statutory scheme and the degree of lati-
tude given to each state court in defining the term "parent." Once a state
legislature has set the parameters of the definition, the courts consistently
have decided cases in light of the legislative intent.
Even in the best case scenario, where the courts have recognized de
facto parent status, de facto parents are not accorded the same rights as a
legal parent. This limited recognition only allows the successful pursuit
of a visitation action; it does not afford the lesbian partner the opportu-
nity to pursue joint custody over the legal mother's objection. In order
to successfully pursue a child custody action, the de facto parent will
have to demonstrate that the legal parent is unfit. This is undesirable
from the lesbian parent's standpoint for two reasons. First, a showing of
unfitness is much more difficult than a showing of either necessary and
proper or best interests of the child. Second, it appears that most nonbio-
logical lesbian parents desire joint custody, not a determination that they
are entitled to sole custody. De facto parenthood thus appears to be an
ineffective theory for lesbian parents seeking custody of their children.
96. 157 Wis. 2d 431, 459 N.W.2d 602 (1990), review granted by Sporleder v. Hermes, 464
N.W.2d 423 (1990), and aff'd, 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991).
97. Id at 432, 459 N.W.2d at 603.
98. Id at 433-34, 459 N.W.2d at 603.
99. Id, 459 N.W.2d at 605.
100. Id at 435-36, 459 N.W.2d at 605.
101. Id. at 436, 459 N.W.2d at 605.
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B. In Loco Parentis
The in loco parentis doctrine is another method of alleging
parenthood often utilized by nonbiological lesbian parents when their
status as a parent does not fulfill the precise language of the statutory
definition. The argument is that, while the proponent is not the adoptive
or biological parent of the child, she is standing in the shoes of a parent
and should be accorded the legal rights of a parent.
(1) California
A California appellate court has described the concept of in loco
parentis in the following terms:
[A] person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by
assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship, without
going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption .... stand[s]
in loco parentis, and the rights, duties and liabilities of such person are
the same as those of the lawful parent. 102
In California, this doctrine has developed primarily in the area of step-
parent-stepchild relationships. 10 3 In pursuing a child custody or visita-
tion action, stepparents have at least two distinct advantages over
nonbiological parents in a same-sex relationship. First, since they are
legally married to the biological parent, they gain standing to the action
through the underlying marriage dissolution proceeding. Second, the
stepparent can adopt the child without divesting their married partner of
their parental rights. Neither of these options is available in a same-sex
relationship. With the enactment of California Civil Code section
4351.5,104 which accords stepparents visitation rights, the need to pursue
child custody under the doctrine of in loco parentis has been reduced
sharply. l0 5
102. Loomis v. State, 228 Cal. App. 2d 820, 823, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822 (1964).
103. See, e.g., Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748
(1985); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931), overruled on other grounds by
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Perry v. Superior
Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1980); Loomis v. State, 228 Cal. App. 2d
820, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1964).
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (West Supp. 1991). Section 4351.5 was added in 1982,
apparently in response to the court of appeal's invitation to address the "thorny problem of
stepparent visitation." Michelle W., 39 Cal. 3d at 368, 703 P.2d at 96-97, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 756
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
105. Section 4351.5 provides a petition and mediation procedure for stepparent visitation
rights during dissolution or annulment proceedings. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (West 1983);
see also Sandra R. Blair, Comment, Recent Developments, Jurisdiction, Standing, and Deci-
sional Standards in Parent-Nonparent Custody Disputes, 58 WASH. L. REV. 111, 112 (1982)
(arguing that a stepparent should not automatically have standing to seek custody based on an
in locoparentis relationship, but should have standing to petition the court for custody). How-
ever, as Chief Justice Bird pointed out in her dissent in Michelle W., the enactment of the
statute did not affect a stepparent's right to pursue an alternative custody action under the in
[Vol. 43
This doctrine had not been raised in any published California cus-
tody case involving a nonbiological lesbian parent until 1991 in Nancy S.
v. Michele G. 106 Unfortunately, the doctrine fails to offer favorable re-
course to nonbiological lesbian parents for the same reasons that de facto
parenthood has been unsuccessful. The reasons for its failure are two-
fold: First, the doctrine will not independently provide subject matter
jurisdiction and standing to lesbian partners who are pursuing custody
and visitation actions; and second, even if the biological mother files an
action for declaratory relief, and thus brings her partner before the court,
the courts continuously have refused to equate alternative parental theo-
ries with legal parenthood. 10 7 The doctrine fails to provide standing be-
cause the statutory scheme and legislative intent of California Civil Code
section 4600 prevent the court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction
without one of the previously described underlying proceedings. 0 8
Therefore, a lesbian partner of the child's biological mother, alleging in
loco parentis without an underlying proceeding, is still unable to get into
court via section 4600. The California courts also will continue to reject
parentage determination actions brought by nonbiological lesbian par-
ents under California Civil Code section 7015 if the nonbiological parent
is not a natural or adoptive parent of the child. 109 Finally, the appellate
court in Nancy S. specifically rejected the doctrine of in loco parentis as
bestowing upon a nonparent the same rights as a legal parent. 110
(2) The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis in Other States
As with the theory of de facto parenthood, successful utilization of
the in loco parentis doctrine is dependent upon the different states' stat-
utes and their respective courts' interpretation of such provisions. As
noted in the following discussion, even if the state statutory scheme al-
lows the nonbiological lesbian parent standing to pursue a child custody
and visitation action, her status as a person standing in loco parentis is
not equivalent to the status of the legal, biological parent.
In New York, the possibility of an unmarried, nonbiological parent
using the theory of in loco parentis to petition for visitation was rejected
in Alison D. v. Virginia M. 111 In Alison D., two women lived together as
a family unit for five years, mutually planned the pregnancy of the bio-
logical mother by artificial insemination, agreed to share equally as co-
parents all duties and obligations of raising the child, and agreed to share
loco parentis doctrine. Michele W., 39 Cal. 3d at 369, 703 P.2d at 97, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 757
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
106. 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 838, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (1991).
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
110. Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 838, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
111. 155 A.D.2d 11, 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1990).
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the household and child support expenses.1 12 Upon the couple's separa-
tion, the nonbiological parent petitioned for child visitation rights.
In denying the nonbiological parent's habeas corpus petition, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that she was not a
"parent" within the meaning of the statute that allowed "either parent"
to apply for writ of habeas corpus to determine issues of visitation.113
The court refused to accept the petitioner's argument that she stood in
loco parentis to the child and, therefore, was a "parent" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 14 The supreme court, relying on Ronald FF. v. Cindy
GG., 115 succinctly stated "[tlhe court declines to adopt the definition of a
parent as someone standing in loco parentis." 116 In Ronald FF. the court
had stated that the special circumstances rule of Bennett v. Jeffreys 117 did
not apply to grant visitation rights to a "biological stranger" when the
child was in the custody of the fit biological mother."" The special cir-
cumstances rule provides:
[I]ntervention by the State in the right and responsibility of a natural
parent to custody of her or his child is warranted if there is first a
judicial finding of surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent ne-
glect, unfortunate or involuntary extended disruption of custody, or
other equivalent but rare extraordinary circumstance which would
drastically affect the welfare of the child." 9
The Alison D. court found no distinction between the labels "in loco
parentis" and "special circumstances," noting that their legal analyses
were essentially the same.' 20 Therefore, in order for the nonbiological
parent to gain custody of the child she would need to prove that the
natural mother was unfit. This "unfitness" standard requires a higher
burden than the best interests of the child standard, which is typically
applied in custody disputes between natural or adoptive parents.' 2'
In Hughes v. Creighton 122 the Arizona Court of Appeals similarly
held that an unmarried nonbiological parent standing in loco parentis
does not fulfill the statutory definition of "parent" in order to achieve
standing to seek child visitation rights1 23 The case involved a heterosex-
ual couple who lived together as husband and wife but did not marry.
112. Id. at 12, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
113. Id at 13, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
114. Id.
115. 70 N.Y.2d 141, 511 N.E.2d 75, 517 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1987).
116. Alison D., 155 A.D.2d at 13, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
117. 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976), appeal sub nom. Bennett v.
Marrow, 51 A.D.2d 544 399 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1977).
118. Ronald FF, 70 N.Y.2d at 142, 511 N.E.2d at 76, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
119. Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 549, 356 N.E.2d at 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
120. Alison D., 155 A.D.2d at 11, 15, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
121. Id. at 13, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
122. 165 Ariz. 265, 798 P.2d 403 (1990).
123. Id. at 269, 798 P.2d at 406.
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Prior to living together, but while they were dating, Creighton became
pregnant and informed Hughes that he was the father. After their subse-
quent break-up, a paternity test determined that Hughes was not the nat-
ural father. Hughes then attempted to bring an action seeking child
visitation rights. In deciding whether Hughes was a parent for purposes
of visitation, the court strictly construed the language of the child cus-
tody statute "according to the common and approved use of the language
unless the words have acquired a particular and appropriate meaning in
the law."124 The court determined that the common usage of "parent"
referred to someone who either biologically had produced or legally had
adopted the child.125 Since Hughes was neither the child's biological nor
adoptive father, he was not a "parent" and, thus, was denied visitation.
Though the results reached in Hughes and Curiale are similar in
that the court refused standing based on the statutory definition of par-
ent, there are crucial differences. First, Hughes and Creighton were a
heterosexual couple who had the legal right to marry if they so chose.
Curiale and Reagan did not have this choice. Second, once married,
Hughes would have had the option of adopting Creighton's child
through the statutory procedure of stepparent adoption. This opportu-
nity is not available to lesbians, as they legally cannot marry. Third,
during marriage dissolution proceedings, Hughes would have standing to
seek child custody under the Arizona statute as a stepparent, even
though he was not the natural father of the child.1 26 Once again, this
option is not available to same-sex couples because they cannot legally
marry or divorce. Finally, since Hughes and Creighton did not marry
and only lived together after the birth of the child, the couple probably
did not mutually decide to have a child and start a family together. This
is evidenced by the existence of an actual, even if unidentified, natural
father. The Curiale case is distinguishable. Curiale and Reagan mutu-
ally decided to raise a child, and Reagan was legally artificially insemi-
nated. No other legal natural parent existed, as in Hughes.
The comparison between Hughes and Curiale further highlights the
injustice and inequity of the legal system's failure to offer legal recogni-
tion to nonbiological, nonadoptive lesbian parents in same-sex relation-
ships. The Hughes decision appears equitable because prior to the
relationship's break-up, Hughes, as a heterosexual, had at least two op-
tions available to legalize his relationship with the child: marriage or
adoption. Curiale, as a lesbian partner in a same-sex relationship had
neither of these options. Especially poignant is the fact that lesbian wo-
124. d
125. Id.
126. ARiz. R Ev. STAT. ANN. § 25-337 (1991); see Bryan v. Bryan, 132 Ariz. 353, 645 P.2d
1267 (1982) (holding that stepparent standing in loco parentis was "noncustodial parent" for
purpose of visitation statute).
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men, such as Curiale and Reagan, carefully plan their families together
prior to the birth of any children and, thus, express their desire to parent
a family together. In a legally sanctioned stepparent situation, however,
the stepparent had no influence or interest in the birth of the stepchil-
dren. The stepparent's interest in the family comes later, after the birth
of the children.
It is interesting to note, therefore, that during dissolution proceed-
ings, many states allow a nonadoptive stepparent standing in loco paren-
tis to seek custody of the biological parent's children.1 27 The most
prominent and frequently cited case in this regard is Gribble v. Gribble.128
In Gribble the Utah court drew a distinction between being a stepparent
and stepparent standing in loco parentis. The court noted that, although
the stepparent relationship alone did not confer rights or obligations, if
the stepparent was standing in loco parentis, he would be in a different
position, which would bring him within the statute as a natural parent
with the same rights and obligations. 129 The court held that, "whether
or not one assumes this status depends on whether that person intends to
assume that obligation."' 130
The Washington statutory scheme goes one step further and extends
to nonparents the stepparent option of seeking child custody.1 31 Under
127. See Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982) (holding that, when steppar-
ent has assumed in loco parentis status, stepchild is a child of the marriage for purposes of
granting jurisdiction to determine custody); Klipstein v. Zalewski, 230 N.J. Super. 567, 574-75,
553 A.2d 1384, 1388 (1988) (holding that stepparent can seek visitation during dissolution
proceedings by alleging in loco parentis status); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah
1978) (entitling stepfather to hearing to determine whether he stood in loco parentis to
stepchild and, if so, whether it was in child's best interest to grant visitation); In re Marriage of
Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 644-45, 626 P.2d 16, 20 (1981) (concluding that stepparent in loco
parentis has standing to seek custody during marriage dissolution).
In other states, stepparent visitation statutes grant more rights to stepparents, with no
allegation of in loco parentis necessary. See, eg., Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 343-44, 488
A.2d 157, 162 (1985) (granting nonadoptive stepmother visitation in accordance with state
statute; in locoparentis status not necessary); Fisher v. Fisher, 99 Nev. 762, 764, 670 P.2d 572,
573 (1983) (holding that ex-stepparent has statutory standing to seek guardianship of child as a
concerned person).
128. 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). For cases relying on Gribble, see Charter v. Brodrick, 644
P.2d 850, 853 (Alaska 1982); Bryan v. Bryan, 132 Ariz. 353, 358, 645 P.2d 1267, 1272 (1982);
Perry v. Superior Ct., 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 486, 166 Cal Rptr. 583, 586 (1980); Simpson v.
Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1979); Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 343, 488 A.2d 157, 161
(1985); Fisher v. Fisher, 99 Nev. 762, 764, 670 P.2d 572, 573 (1983); Klipstein v. Zalewski, 230
N.J. Super. 567, 571, 553 A.2d 1384, 1386 (1988)1 Paquette v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 83, 88, 499
A.2d 23, 28 (1985).
129. Id. at 66.
130. Id.
131. A nonparent is distinct from a stepparent, in that the latter benefits from the marriage
relationship with a biological parent, but the former is a live-in companion such as a lesbian
partner or boyfriend.
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Revised Code of Washington section 26.10.030(l),132 a custody proceed-
ing can be initiated "by a person other than a parent... , but only if the
child is not in the physical custody of one of its parents or if the peti-
tioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian."' 33 In In re
Dombrowski,134 a Washington court held that the statute provided that
the male live-in companion of the biological mother had standing to seek
custody as a nonparent.135 The court reiterated the Washington legisla-
ture's intent to allow custody petitions by nonparents and added that
parental rights remained protected due to the requirement that the peti-
tioner had to allege that the child was not in the physical custody of the
mother or that neither parent would be a suitable custodian.136
The Alaska court recently interpreted its state's custody statutes as
conferring standing on nonparents to assert claims for custody as long as
the nonparent has a "significant connection" to the child.137 In Buness v.
Gillen, the Supreme Court of Alaska tackled the issue of whether a
nonparent could invoke the court's jurisdiction to bring a child custody
action against the biological parent.' 38 The court held that Alaska Stat-
ute section 25.20.060,139 which mentions only "parents," did not intend
to exclude from the superior court's jurisdiction custody disputes be-
tween parents and nonparents.140 Furthermore, the court held that a
nonparent with a "significant connection" with the child has standing to
pursue a custody action.' 4 '
The Buness court relied on an earlier in loco parentis case, Carter v.
Brodrick 42 which had held that if a stepparent stood in loco parentis to
the stepchild, the child was "a child of the marriage" for purposes of the
custody statute. 43 In Buness the court followed Carter and extended
jurisdiction from stepparents to nonparents by determining that the legis-
lature had "anticipated and granted" jurisdiction for custody and visita-
tion suits in a "variety of situations where biological parentage is not a
determinative factor of jurisdiction."' 44 The court also acknowledged
that the statutes recognized that the child's psychological as well as bio-
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (1987).
133. Id.
134. 41 Wash. App. 753, 705 P.2d 1218 (1985).
135. Id at 757, 705 P.2d at 1221.
136. Id.
137. Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 988 (Alaska 1989).
138. Id at 987.
139. The statute reads in pertinent part, "If there is a dispute over child custody, either
parent may petition the superior court for resolution of the matter .... ." ALAsKA STAT.
§ 25.20.060 (1990) (emphasis added).
140. Buness, 781 P.2d at 988.
141. Id.
142. 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982).
143. Id. at 855.
144. Buness, 781 P.2d at 987.
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logical relationships were important and, thus, needed protection to en-
sure the best interests of the child.145
After the Buness court determined the jurisdiction and standing is-
sues, it articulated an additional factor that the superior court should
consider when settling custody disputes between biological and nonbio-
logical parents: the nonparent must show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that custody to the biological parent would be detrimental to the
child. 146 The effect of the Alaska decisions is to allow standing to
nonparents when there is a significant connection to the child, but addi-
tionally to compel a showing of the higher "detriment" standard. Thus,
while a lesbian partner has easier access to an Alaskan court, she is re-
quired to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the biological
parent is "'unfit, had abandoned the child, or that the welfare of the
child requires that [the] non-parent receive custody.' "147 This more dif-
ficult requirement of showing detriment is undesirable and demonstrates
that the lesbian partner standing in loco parentis still is not on equal foot-
ing with the biological parent.
Oregon has the best articulated statute that allows persons who have
established emotional ties to a child through a child-parent relationship
to intervene in child custody cases.148 Oregon Revised Statute section
109.119(1) provides:
Any person including but not limited to a foster parent, stepparent,
grandparent or relative by blood or marriage who has established emo-
tional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child... may
petition ... for an order providing for custody or placement of the
child or visitation rights or other generally recognized rights of a par-
ent or person in loco parentis.149
The statute does not confer any substantive custody rights, but rather it
affords the individual the right to petition or intervene.150 The legislative
intent behind the statute was to allow the courts to incorporate all rele-
vant information about the existence of such a relationship into the deci-
sionmaking process, thereby most effectively serving the child's best
interests. 151 With regard to custody disputes between natural parents
and nonparents, the Supreme Court of Oregon has held that "a natural
parent has the right to the custody of his or her children, absent a com-
pelling reason for placing the children in the custody of another.' 52
This, in effect, means that in Oregon the "best interests of the child"
145. Id.
146. Id at 989 & n.7.
147. Id. at 989 (quoting,Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975)).
148. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1989).
149. Id. The statute also defines the necessary child-parent relationship that must be al-
leged and requires that such relationship be of at least one year duration. Id. § 109.119(4)-(5).
150. In re Hruby, 304 Or. 500, 512, 748 P.2d 57, 64 (1987).
151. Id. at 512-14, 748 P.2d at 64.
152. Id. at 510, 748 P.2d at 63.
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standard used in custody disputes between natural parents during disso-
lution proceedings does not apply to custody disputes between a natural
parent and another person. 153 In articulating the "compelling reason"
standard to be used in custody disputes between a parent and a
nonparent, the court emphasized that, in such disputes, the major con-
cern was not maximizing the child's welfare but determining whether the
child would receive adequate love and care from its natural parent. 54
Since the Oregon Supreme Court's Hruby decision, however, section
109.119(1) has been amended to include the following additional
sentence:
If the court determines that custody, guardianship, right of visitation,
or other generally recognized right of a parent or person in loco paren-
tis, is appropriate in the case, the court shall grant such custody,
guardianship, right of visitation or other right to the person having the
child-parent relationship, if to do so is in the best interest of the
child. 15 5
Whether this additional sentence affects the "compelling reason" stan-
dard applied to nonparents remains unclear, as the issue has not been put
before the court. The Supreme Court of Oregon has noted, however, that
"it would never be proper to give custody to someone other than a natu-
ral parent unless custody in the other person best served the child's
interests." 156
The phrase "is appropriate in the case" will most likely be inter-
preted in light of the courts' historical preference for granting custody to
"parents" over nonparents. Such an interpretation will be useless to
nonbiological lesbian parents unless the court is willing to characterize
their status as equivalent to that of the legal parent and finds it appropri-
ate to award joint custody in such a circumstance.
Even if the lesbian partner attains standing to pursue an action for
child custody and visitation through the use of the in loco parentis doc-
trine, this achievement is only half the battle. In all states, with the pos-
sible exception of Oregon, the nonbiological lesbian partner will be
required to show the higher "detriment" standard in order to gain cus-
tody over the legal parent's objections. This is true even if the lesbian
parent does not desire sole custody and wishes to share custody with the
legal parent.
C. Equitable Parenthood
An equitable parent is a person who is not the biological parent of
the child, but who desires such recognition, is willing to accept the obli-
153. Ild.
154. Id. at 511, 748 P.2d at 63.
155. OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1989).
156. Hruby, 304 Or. at 516 n.9, 748 P.2d at 66 n.9.
November 1991]
gations of supporting the child and in return wants the "reciprocal
rights" of custody and visitation. 157 Although the terms equitable parent
and de facto parent are sometimes used interchangeably, they have differ-
ent origins. Equitable parenthood is grounded in the theories of equita-
ble estoppel and equitable adoption, 158 while de facto parenthood is
rooted in the definition of psychological parent.' 59
Equitable estoppel is the doctrine that a person may be precluded by
his actions, conduct, or silence when he is obligated to speak, from as-
serting a right that he otherwise would have possessed. 6° Fundamental
fairness prevents a party from benefitting from prior inconsistent conduct
upon which others have relied to their detriment. 161 In the family law
context, this doctrine primarily has been used to prevent husbands from
denying paternity as a method of avoiding child support payments.1 62
Equitable adoption refers to a situation in which an oral contract to
adopt a child is fully performed, and even though it lacks full compliance
with the applicable adoption statute, the child is considered legally
adopted for inheritance purposes.1 63
(1) California
The doctrine of equitable estoppel was raised in the paternity area of
family law in the 1961 case of Clevenger v. Clevenger.'" Clevenger in-
volved the question of whether a husband owed a duty of support to his
157. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 610, 408 N.W.2d 516, 520 (1987).
158. Id at 604, 609-10, 408 N.W.2d at 517, 519-20.
159. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that de facto parenthood is rooted
in the definition of psychological parent); see also GOLDSTMIN et al., supra note 13, at 17.
160. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Mitchell v. McIntee, 15 Or.
App. 85, 88, 514 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1973)). Four elements must be present to apply the doctrine
of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must
intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel
had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state
of facts; and (4) the other party must rely upon the conduct to his injury. In re Szwed, 221
Cal. App. 3d 1403, 1415-16, 271 Cal. Rptr. 121, 129 (1990) (citing Driscoll v. City of Los
Angeles, 67 Cal. 2d 297, 305, 431 P.2d 245, 250, 61 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1967)).
161. In re Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 840, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 (1975).
162. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) (applying
estoppel to husband who had represented himself as father of his wife's illegitimate child); In
re Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1975) (applying estoppel to husband who had
represented himself as father of his niece and nephew); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.
2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961) (refusing to apply estoppel to husband who had not repre-
sented himself to the child as the child's natural father); Johnson v. Johnson, 93 Mich. App.
415, 286 N.W.2d 886 (1979) (estopping plaintiff from denying paternity when he had repre-
sented himself as father). But see Berrisford v. Berrisford, 322 N.W.2d 742 (Minn. 1982)
(refusing to apply estoppel to prevent husband from denying paternity through blood tests).
163. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 482 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Barlow v. Barlow, 170 Colo.
465, 472, 463 P.2d 305, 308 (1969)).
164. 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961).
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wife's illegitimate child. 165 The court held that the husband would be
estopped from denying the paternity of the child in order to avoid paying
child support if: the husband represented to the child that he was the
natural father; the husband intended his representation to be accepted
and acted upon; the child relied upon the representation; and the child
was ignorant of the true facts. 166 The court restricted its holding by re-
quiring that the husband expressly or by implication represent himself as
the true father to the child and that the representation must be of such
long duration that it frustrates the child's opportunity to discover his
true father.167
The Clevenger holding laid the foundation for the decision reached
in the 1975 case of In re Valle. 168 The Valle court held that the husband,
in treating his niece and nephew as his own children, was estopped from
denying paternity and thereby avoiding child support payments.1 69 The
husband argued that, because of the lack of an "actual" parental relation-
ship, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the matters of
custody and support.1 70 Responding to this argument, the court relied
on Clevenger and reasoned, "we perceive no good reason why the trial
court should not have jurisdiction to award child custody when the
parenthood is established by estoppel and when the issue is fairly and
properly litigated with both parties present."1 71
Although the court's response would appear to offer a legal remedy
to a nonbiological lesbian parent seeking standing to sue for child cus-
tody and visitation, a critical distinction must be recognized. In Valle,
the court had jurisdiction over the issue of child custody through the
underlying marriage dissolution proceeding which was before the court.
An unmarried nonbiological parent, such as Curiale, would still remain
unable to initiate a child custody proceeding without an underlying
action. 172
Furthermore, the California Court of Appeal specifically refused to
extend the reasoning in the Valle decision to cases in which the nonbio-
logical lesbian parent is seeking child custody and visitation over the ob-
jection of the biological parent.1 73 In Nancy S. v. Michele G., the court
rejected the use of parenthood by equitable estoppel, noting that it had
165. Id. at 662, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
166. Id. at 671, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
167. It at 674-75, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
168. 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1975).
169. Id. at 842, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 42. The Valles were raising their niece and nephew
because the biological parents had died.
170. Id. at 843, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
171. Id at 842, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 42 (emphasis in original).
172. See supra notes 28-52 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative intent and
limitations of California Civil Code §§ 4600 and 7000-7021).
173. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 839 & n.6, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 218
& n.6 (1991).
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"never been invoked in California against a natural parent for the pur-
pose of awarding custody and visitation to a nonparent."1 74 The court
distinguished Valle from the instant case by first noting that in Valle
neither the husband nor the wife were the biological parents of the chil-
dren. 175 The court went on to note that the Valle court used the concept
of equitable estoppel to refute the husband's claim that, because the niece
and nephew were not "children of the marriage," the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to award custody to the wife.176 Valle was denying his pater-
nity, while Michele G. was trying to assert her parental rights and duties.
Although recognizing that other states have initiated the use of equitable
estoppel to prevent a wife from denying her husband's paternity, the
Nancy S. court concluded that the doctrine could not be utilized effec-
tively in the instant case. The use of the doctrine in other states has been
"rooted in '[o]ne of the strongest presumptions in law (i.e.) that a child
born to a married woman is the legitimate child of her husband.' "177
Since this presumption did not exist in Nancy S., the court held the doc-
trine inapplicable to establish parenthood by equitable estoppel.
The court also declined to adopt the doctrine of equitable
parenthood and cited the earlier case of In re Goetz178 for support. 179 In
Goetz, the court specifically declined to extend the reasoning behind the
equitable adoption doctrine180 to an equitable parenthood doctrine that
would grant standing to nonparents in child custody battles. 181
Although the court acknowledged that the legislature had given "limited
174. Id. at 839, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
175. .ra at 839 n.6, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218 n.6.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (quoting Brenda J. Runner, Protecting a Husband's
Parental Rights When His Wife Disputes the Presumption of Legitimacy, 28 J. FAM. L. 115, 116
(1989-90)).
178. 203 Cal. App. 3d 514, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1988).
179. Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19 (1991) (citing Goetz 203
Cal. App. at 519-20, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33). But cf Sabol v. Bowling, No. CF 27024 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Jan. 30, 1989) (allowing a nonparent to proceed to trial under
the claim of "parental estoppel"). In Sabol, the nonbiological lesbian parent's brother was the
sperm donor and therefore she was "biologically related" to the child as an aunt. The superior
court did not consider the biological link in allowing her to proceed to trial, but rather based
its decision on equitable estoppel grounds. Her request for visitation was later denied on the
grounds that the child was too young to have developed significant enough bonds with Sabol to
require visitation. Id. at 10. See Judge Denies Woman Custody of Lesbian Ex-Lover's Child,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1989, at B3.
180. The doctrine of equitable adoption is recognized in California solely for the purposes
of inheritance. See Goetz 203 Cal. App. 3d at 519, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33; see also Estate of
Radovich, 48 Cal. 2d 116, 130, 308 P.2d 14, 24 (1957) ("The child does not become, in a legal
sense, the child of the adopting parents except for the purpose of receiving title to their prop-
erty.. . .") (Schauer, J., dissenting); Estate of Wilson, 111 Cal. App. 3d 242, 244-45, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 534 (1980) (holding that equitable adoption doctrine is part of California law and
allows an equitably adopted child to inherit by virtue of contract).
181. Goetz, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 519, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
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recognition" to the equitable parenthood theory by enacting Civil Code
section 4531.5,182 the stepparent visitation statute, the court concluded
that there was no indication that the legislature intended to bestow cus-
tody rights on stepparents upon marriage dissolution. 8 3 The court un-
equivocally held that this change was the legislature's responsibility.18 4
(2) Other States' Extension of Equitable Estoppel to Equitable Parenthood
The doctrine of equitable parenthood first was recognized outside of
California in the 1987 Michigan case of Atkinson v. Atkinson. 8 5 In At-
kinson the court held:
[A] husband who is not the biological father of a child born or con-
ceived during the marriage may be considered the natural father of
that child where (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge
a relationship as father and child, or the mother of the child has coop-
erated in the development of such a relationship over a period of time
prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband desires
to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing
to take on the responsibility of paying child support. 186
After discussing an earlier case in which the husband was estopped from
denying parenthood, the Atkinson court acknowledged that a logical ex-
tension of estoppel was to recognize a nonbiological parent as a parent
"when he desires such recognition and is willing to support the child as
well as wants the reciprocal rights of custody or visitation afforded to a
parent."187 The court bolstered its new theory by analogizing equitable
parenthood to equitable adoption.188
Before adopting this principle, the Atkinson court had to consider
whether it had a legal basis for "fashioning" this doctrine. 8 9 The court
determined that the Michigan Child Custody Act was equitable in na-
ture, and that its provisions were to be liberally construed. 190
182. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing California Civil Code
§ 4351.5). Section 4531.5 provides only "limited recognition" to the theory because it allows
the stepparent standing to pursue a visitation claim, but not an action for child custody.
183. Goetz 203 Cal. App. 3d at 519, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
184. Id. at 520, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
185. 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987); see Rebekah F. Visconti, Note, The
Legal Relationship of a Nonbiological Father to His Child: A Matter of Equity, 66 U. DET. L.
REV. 97, 98 (1988) (discussing extensively the Atkinson case and equitable estoppel).
186. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. at 608-09, 408 N.W.2d at 519.
187. Id. at 610, 408 N.W.2d at 520.
188. Id. at 611, 408 N.W.2d at 520; see also Judith A. Curtis, Family Law, 35 WAYNE L.
REV. 599, 629-30 (1989) (discussing the reasons the court adopted the equitable parent
doctrine).
189. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. at 609, 408 N.W.2d at 519.
190. Id
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The California Court of Appeal twice reviewed the Atkinson case
and its reasoning and twice refused to create a similar doctrine.191 Even
if the California courts were to adopt such a theory, it is unlikely that it
would successfully overcome the language of Civil Code sections 7001,
7003, and 7015, which jointly restrict the operative definition of legal
parent and parentage determination actions to natural or adoptive par-
ents. 192 Since an "equitable parent" does not fit within the above enu-
merated statutes, she would be prevented from filing a parentage action
under the Uniform Parentage Act. Additionally, without an underlying
proceeding, the "equitable parent" would not have standing to pursue a
child custody action under California Civil Code section 4600.193 Fur-
thermore, it is doubtful that the court would give an equitable parent the
same rights and benefits as the natural parent. An "equitable parent,"
therefore, would not be on equal footing with the natural parent and
would be burdened with the higher "detriment" standard in order to gain
custody of the child.194
HI. Legal Recognition for the Other Mother
Courts and social commentators alike have extended token recogni-
tion to diversity, alternative lifestyles, and the movement of the family
away from the traditional nuclear model. 195 It is well documented, how-
ever, that nontraditional families still lack the legal recognition tradition-
ally associated with the more socially accepted nuclear family. 196 As the
New York Court of Appeals recently recognized, in Braschi v. Stahl As-
191. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 218-19
(1991); supra notes 173-185 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
195. See e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977) (granting
constitutional protection beyond nuclear families to extended families); Moore Shipbuilding
Corp. v. Indusustrial Accident Comm'n, 185 Cal. 200, 207, 196 P. 257, 259 (1921) ("[Family
may] mean different things under different circumstances. The family, for instance, may be...
a particular group of people related by blood or marriage, or not related at all, who are living
together in the intimate and mutual interdependence of a single home or household.").
One report notes, "It should be the policy of the government and all private institutions to
accept diversity as a source of strength in family life which must be considered in planning
policy and programs." 2 CALIFORNIA JOINT SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE CHANGING FAM-
ILY, CALIFORNIA COUPLES: RECOGNIZING DIVERSITY AND STRENGTHENING FUNDAMEN-
TAL RELATIONSHIPS, COUPLES WORKGROUP PRELIMINARY REPORT 276 (1988).
196. See Shapiro & Schultz, supra note 6, at 280-81 (arguing that states must recognize the
existence of single-sex families); Myra G. Sencer, Note, Adoption in the Nontraditional Fam-
ily-A Look at Some Alternatives, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 191, 195 (1987) (exploring the possi-
bility of recognizing less traditional family units as an alternative to the two-parent family); see
also Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homo-
sexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1790-1803 (1988) (urging court to recognize homosexual
marriage and offer legal, social, and economic protections to these family units).
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sociates, 197 the definition of family can, and should, be expanded beyond
traditional boundaries to reflect the needs of today's society. 198 The
existence of single-sex families can no longer be denied, and to continue
to ignore their plight will not curtail their continued existence.199 The
desirability of redefining parenthood and moving away from the tradi-
tional model of mother and father as the only ideal "parents" is discussed
frequently in the family law arena.200 Unfortunately, as illustrated in the
above comparison of California's decisional and statutory law with other
states' statutory and case law, the theories of de facto parenthood, in loco
parentis, and equitable parenthood have not received a warm welcome by
California courts entertaining custody disputes between a biological par-
ent and nonbiological lesbian parent. The reasons the courts have been
unable to extend standing to the nonbiological lesbian parent are two-
fold: The language of California Civil Code section 4600 does not inde-
pendently provide subject matter jurisdiction over such disputes;201 and
the courts apparently are unwilling to interpret the definition of "parent"
as connoting something more than just natural or adoptive parental rela-
tionships.202 Additionally, even if the biological mother files an action
for declaratory relief, and thus brings her partner before the court, the
courts consistently have refused to equate alternative parental theories
with legal parenthood.20 3 The time has thus arrived for the California
legislature to redefine the parent-child relationship and to recognize the
nonbiological partner in a same-sex couple as a legal parent.
The California Court of Appeal in both Curiale v. Reagan204 and
Nancy S. v. Michele G.205 asserted that this change is the legislature's
197. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
198. The Braschi court observed: "In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and cer-
tainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is
longterm and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence."
Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
199. See supra note 6 (discussing increasing numbers of gay couples forming families).
200. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status" The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv.
879, 882 (1984); Emily C. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital Barrier Is
in a Child's Best Interest,% 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 96, 96 (1987); Nancy D. Polikoff, The
Child Does Have Two Mothers: Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459, 462 (1990); Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian
Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal Challenges, 14 REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
907, 911 (1986) [hereinafter Polikoff, Legal Obstacles]; Carrie Bashaw, Comment, Protecting
Children in Nontraditional Families: Second Parent Adoptions in Washington, 13 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 321, 321 (1990); Elizabeth Zuckerman, Comment, Second Parent Adoption for
Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAviS L. REv.
729, 733 (1986).
201. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
204. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990).
205. 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991).
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responsibility: "Given the complex practical, social and constitutional
ramifications of the [de facto parent] doctrine, we believe the legislature
is better equipped to consider expansion of current California law should
it choose to do So. ''206 In 1982 the legislature handled the "thorny prob-
lem of visitation by stepparents" through the enactment of California
Civil Code section 4351.5.207 The legislature protected these relation-
ships because of the state's interest in protecting the family.208 In re-
sponse to the redefinition of what constitutes a faniily in our changing
society, the legislature next must craft a new definition of the parent-
child relationship. This must be done to protect these valid parent-child
relationships, even though they are not the traditional heterosexual rela-
tionships many consider the only proper kind.
The following sections describe two proposals to effectuate the goal
of legal recognition for alternative family situations in California: the
statutory redefinition of the parent-child relationship, and the enactment
of a second parent adoption statute. These recommendations emphasize
the need to afford legal and social protection to intentionally created non-
traditional families, while avoiding unwarranted outside interference
from nonparents and the state.
A. Statutory Redefinition of the Parent-Child Relationship
This Note argues that, under certain circumstances, a nonbiological,
unmarried partner in a same-sex relationship is the child's "parent" and
should be recognized as such. The author does not advocate, however,
an extension of nonparents' standing in general custody proceedings
through expansion of California Civil Code section 4600. When redefin-
ing the parent-child relationship the legislature must leave section 4600
intact. The legislative intent behind section 4600 protects the family unit
from unwarranted outside disruption by nonparents. 209
206. Curiale, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600-01, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (quoting In re Lewis, 203
Cal. App. 3d 514, 519-20, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (1990)); see also Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at
841, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (court states it is unwilling to expand definition of parent because of
"complex practical, social, and constitutional ramifications"; court prefers to defer "to the
legislature in [these] matters"); Polikoff, Legal Obstacles, supra note 200, at 910-11 ("To pro-
tect the status and interests of the unrecognized mother, we should consider both litigation and
legislative strategies.... In most states legislative change will be the only recourse, an unlikely
occurrence at present.").
207. Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 368-69, 703 P.2d 88, 96-97, 216 Cal. Rptr.
748, 756 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 1043 (1986).
208. See Richard S. Victor, When Third Parties Come First-Asserting the Custodial
Rights of Nonparents, 12 FAM. ADVOC. 8, 45 (Fall 1989) ("Currently 15 states [including
California, Alaska and Oregon] have specifically established a broad range of custody, visita-
tion, and support rights for stepparents either through legislative enactments or appellate case
decisions.")
209. See White v. Jacobs, 198 Cal. App. 3d 122, 123, 243 Cal. Rptr. 597, 597 (1988)
(holding that in absence of statutory authority, court could not entertain independent action to
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The most feasible solution that would not disrupt the statutory
scheme of section 4600 is the enactment of a new provision within the
Uniform Parentage Act, California Civil Code sections 7000 and 7021.
The new provision would allow a nonbiological, unmarried "parent"
who has satisfied certain conditions to pursue an action to determine par-
entage even though no biological or adoptive link connects the child to
the "parent." A well-written, narrowly tailored statutory provision
would maintain the integrity of section 4600, yet offer an alternative eq-
uitable solution to persons such as Curiale who cannot currently pursue
an action to seek child custody. The provision would place the lesbian
partner on equal footing with the natural or adoptive parent. Such a
provision must be concisely written, however, to prevent actions insti-
tuted by third parties. 210
The goal of offering Curiale a cause of action, yet continuing to safe-
guard the parent-child relationship from unwarranted intrusion by third
parties, can be achieved by revising California Civil Code sections 7001
and 7003.211 Section 7001 prescribes the existing definition of the parent
and child relationship. 212 Section 7003 outlines the current methods of
establishing a parent-child relationship by a natural or adoptive par-
ent.213 The addition of the terminology "de facto parent" to the statu-
tory language of section 7001 and the addition of a fourth subsection
under section 7003, authorizing a method of establishing a parent-child
relationship by a "de facto parent," would expand the definition of legal
order visitation with grandchild by grandparents over objection of child's parent); see also
supra note 33 (describing legislative intent of CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600).
210. See Polikoff, Legal Obstacles, supra note 200, at 910 & n.13. Professor Polikoffwarns
that if protections provided by case law and statutes expand too far, they will backfire against
the very group they were meant to help. Id. She reiterates the need to avoid conferring psy-
chological parenthood on relatives, friends, or babysitters. Id "The potential for misuse is
frightening." Id at 910. Professor Polikoff further expresses her concern regarding the
mediators in these disputes: "Conflicts will probably be resolved in our court system according
to the cardinal unwritten principle governing custody disputes between lesbian mothers and
straight fathers: that mainstream, conventional, non-threatening values are more likely to pre-
vail." Id at 912.
211. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
212. Section 7001 presently reads: "As used in this part, 'parent and child relationship'
means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents inci-
dent to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes
the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 7001 (West 1983).
213. Section 7003 presently reads:
The parent and child relationship may be established as follows:
(1) Between a child and the natural mother it may be established by proof of her
having given birth to the child, or under this part.
(2) Between a child and the natural father it may be established under this part.
(3) Between a child and an adoptive parent it may be established by proof of
adoption.
Id. § 7003.
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parent beyond natural or adoptive parents to someone in Curiale's or
Michele G.'s position.
Under this proposal, California Civil Code section 7001 would read:
As used in this part, "parent and child relationship" means the
legal relationship existing between a child and his natural, adoptive, or
de facto parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights,
privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child
relationship and the father and child relationship.
The proposed addition to section 7003 would provide an additional
means to establish a parent-child relationship. Newly added section
7003(4) would read, "The parent and child relationship may be estab-
lished as follows: ... (4) Between a child and a de facto parent it may be
established by proof of fulfilling the definition of de facto parenthood".
These changes would allow the courts to give a new interpretation
to the terminology "mother and child relationship" found in California
Civil Code section 7015, which provides for an action to determine the
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship.2 14 This
would require the "parent" to offer proof of her de facto status prior to
being granted party status. If the relationship is so established, the par-
ent would be recognized and accorded the same rights as a legal parent.
As a result, for instance, Curiale would have the opportunity to establish
a parent-child relationship in court even though she is not the natural or
adoptive parent of her child.
This proposal requires that the legislature define the elements of de
facto parenthood. The criteria used to determine the existence of such a
parent-child relationship should reflect the goals of effectively acknowl-
edging an existing, legally unrecognized relationship and successfully cir-
cumscribing the definition of "de facto parent" to prevent inclusion of
unintended third parties. These factors could be derived from at least
three sources: Professor Katherine Bartlett's three-part redefinition of
"parenthood," 215 the Oregon parent-child statute,216 and the definition of
equitable parent from the Michigan case of Atkinson v. Atkinson.217 The
definition of de facto parent, as referred to in the proposed addition to
section 7003, would incorporate principles from all of these sources as
evaluative criteria.
Bartlett offers a theory of nonexclusive parenthood that allows rec-
ognition of de facto parent relationships without terminating the natural
parent's rights.218 Her major concerns regarding expansion of the defini-
tion of parenthood are two-fold: (1) the possibility that a larger number
of adults will make claims upon children, and (2) it may foster "uncer-
214. See supra text accompanying note 30.
215. Bartlett, supra note 200, at 944-51.
216. OR. Rnv. STAT. § 109.119(4) (1989).
217. 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987).
218. Bartlett, supra note 200, at 944.
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tain, unfair and unequal" results. 219 As a deterrent, she recommends
that the state should not interfere with intact families and that the "par-
ent" must prove her legal, natural, or psychological parent status prior to
being granted party status. 220 The criteria she recommends for determin-
ing a psychological parent are: physical custody of the child for at least
six months; mutuality (the parent and the child mutually recognize the
relationship); and proof that the relationship with the child began with
the consent of the child's legal parent.221
The second source that provides assistance in statutorily defining de
facto parenthood status is the language of Oregon's parent-child statute.
Oregon's statutory definition of the "parent-child" relationship is as
follows:
a relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or part, within the six
months preceding the filing of an action under this section, and in
which relationship a person having physical custody of a child or resid-
ing in the same household as the child supplied, or otherwise made
available to the child, food, clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries
and provided the child with necessary care, education and discipline,
and which relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through inter-
action, companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled the
child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's physical
needs.222
The Atkinson court, in a slightly different way, defined equitable
parent in the following terms:
A husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived
during the marriage may be considered the natural father of that child
where (1) the husband and child mutually acknowledge a relationship
as father and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the
development of such a relationship over a period of time prior to the
filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the
rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing to take on
the responsibility of paying child support. 223
It is significant that the Atkinson three-part test defining equitable
parenthood is prefaced by the terminology "a child born or conceived
during the marriage. ' 2 24 This language prevents the parent alleging eq-
uitable parenthood from claiming a legal bond with children born prior
to the relationship. The criterion of mutual acknowledgement of the re-
lationship by parent and child found in Bartlett's three-part test and the
Oregon parent-child statute is mirrored in the first prong of the Atkinson
test. Atkinson, however, allows this factor to be satisfied with a showing
219. Id. at 945 & n.305.
220. Id. at 946.
221. Id. at 946-48.
222. ORE REV. STAT. § 109.119(4) (1989).
223. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 608-09, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (1989).
224. Id.
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that the child's mother cooperated in the development of the relation-
ship. The second prong of the definition, requiring that the partner de-
sire the rights afforded to a parent, is found neither in Bartlett's
construction nor the Oregon parent-child statute. However, this prong
would still be satisfied in those cases in the sense that only a partner
desiring parental rights will pursue such an action. The last prong, a
willingness to pay child support, would also be evidenced by the part-
ner's pursuit of child custody and visitation.
A combination of the above-mentioned elements will provide the
maximum protection for a parent-child relationship between a lesbian
partner and her nonbiological child. Thus, the California statutory defi-
nition of de facto parent should contain the following criteria:
(1) the biological mother and the nonmarital partner must have mutu-
ally decided to start a family prior to the child's conception;
(2) the nonmarital partner and the child must mutually acknowledge a
relationship as parent and child;
(3) the relationship must have been in existence for at least one year
prior to the time of filing the action to determine parentage, during
which time the nonmarital partner must have had physical custody of
the child or resided in the same household as the child; and
(4) the nonmarital partner must have supplied or otherwise made
available to the child food, clothing, shelter, and incidental necessaries
and provided the child with necessary care, education, and discipline,
on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay,
and mutuality that fulfilled the child's psychological needs for a parent
as well as the child's physical needs.
These criteria fulfill the objective of recognizing valid, yet unconven-
tional parent-child relationships while preventing unwarranted intrusion
from unqualified third parties, such as babysitters and temporary live-in
companions. The above definition of de facto parent requires that the
biological parent and de facto parent mutually decide to raise a family
together prior to the conception of the child and that the biological par-
ent fully intend to share legal parenthood with the nonmarital partner.
This requirement of mutual intent carefully draws a distinction between
a de facto parent and a live-in companion who merely resides with the
biological parent and has established a relationship with the partner's
children. The mutual intent requirement thus prevents undue extension
of standing to parties with whom the biological parent did not intend to
share the status of parent. This distinction is necessary to maintain the
integrity of California Civil Code section 4600.
B. Statutory Recognition of Second Parent Adoption
For same-sex couples who form a family after the birth of a child,
and therefore fall outside the statutory revision proposed in the preceding
section, the enactment of a second parent adoption statute would provide
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the best solution to protect the integrity of their family unit.225 Com-
mentators define second parent adoption as "the adoption of a child by
her parent's nonmarital partner, without requiring the first parent to give
up any rights or responsibilities to the child. ' 226 Under such a scheme,
the biological parent's intent to confer legal status upon the nonmarital
partner is established clearly through her consent to the adoption
procedure.
However, traditional adoption statutes typically are unavailable for
the purpose of extending legal parental status to a lesbian partner in a
same-sex relationship. As one commentator noted:
Adoption statutes customarily envision two sets of circumstances in
which adoptions may take place. In the first, where one biological par-
ent has died or consented to the adoption, a stepparent may adopt the
child when he or she marries the other biological parent. In this situa-
tion, the stepparent simply acquires the legal status of the absent par-
ent.... In the second situation, a child can become part of a new
family; adoption extinguishes the rights of the biological parents, in
order to protect the stability of the new family unit.
227
The first circumstance, stepparent adoption, allows the adoption of a
child by the remarried parent's new spouse without affecting the parental
rights of that remarried parent.228 It merely extends parental rights to
the new, nonbiological parent.229 Second parent adoption is similar to
stepparent adoption in that the adoption of the child by the biological
parent's partner does not affect the parental rights of the biological par-
ent.230 Another commentator has argued convincingly that second par-
225. Id.
226. See Sencer, supra note 196 (recognizing that legal rights of the nonbiological partner
do not exist and urging recognition of a legal relationship); Zuckerman, supra note 200 (pro-
posing second parent adoption as an expansion of conventional adoption law).
227. Zuckerman, supra note 200, at 731 n.8; see also Patt, supra note 200, at 127 (defining
second parent adoption as "an adoption granted to a person who is not the natural parent's
spouse in order to protect a child's best interests... which does not result in the termination of
the natural parent's parental status").
228. Polikoff, Legal Obstacles, supra note 200, at 911 n.15.
229. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 227.10(a) (West 1991) ("Any stepparent desiring to
adopt a child of his or her spouse may for that purpose petition the superior ourt.... ."); see
also Marckwardt v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 471, 198 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1984) (holding
that once natural father consented to adoption of his children, he was no longer legal parent
and had no standing to request visitation). But cf CAL. CIV. CODE § 227.44 Section 227.44
provides, in pertinent part:
In a stepparent adoption, the form ... for the consent of the birth parent shall
contain substantially the following notice: "Notice to the parent who gives the child
for adoption: If you and your child lived together at any time as parent and child,
the adoption of your child by a stepparent does not affect the child's right to inherit
your property ...
AL
230. Other issues arise when there is another biological parent. This Note deals specifi-
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ent adoption is a natural extension of the legally recognized procedure of
stepparent adoption.231
The critical distinction between the two procedures, however, is that
stepparent adoption involves marriage and is covered by statutory provi-
sions that do not provide for adoption by unmarried partners. 232 Statu-
tory provisions such as these provide no opportunity for the
nonbiological partner in a same-sex couple legally to adopt her partner's
child. Stepparent adoption is not a viable solution for same-sex couples
because members of the same sex cannot legally marry.233
The second typical adoption scenario, in which the adoption extin-
guishes the rights of the biological parent, is also an inadequate alterna-
tive. Few biological parents would want to extinguish their legal rights
with regard to their children in order to effectuate an adoption by their
nonmarital same-sex partner. Second parent adoption is a particularly
promising alternative because it allows same-sex couples to circumvent
the restrictions in current state adoption statutes, which provide that one
cannot adopt a child unless either the natural parent waives all parental
rights234 or the adopting stepparent is married to the legal parent.235
cally with situations in which the mother has been artificially inseminated or in which there is
no father claiming parental rights.
231. Zuckerman, supra note 200, at 733.
232. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130 (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 227.10 (West 1991);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-233 (Michie 1987).
233. See supra note 50; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 6, at 1605-11 (examin-
ing the right of gay and lesbian couples to marry and arguing that state laws prohibiting same-
sex marriage are constitutionally invalid).
234. CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.76 (West 1991) ("The birth parents of an adopted child are
from the time of the adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for,
the child so adopted, and have no right over the child."); see DONNA HITCHENS, LESBIANS
CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL ISSUES IN DONOR INSEMINATION § VII (San Francisco
Lesbian Rights Project, 1984) (noting that "no state allows an unrelated adult, except in some
cases a stepparent, to adopt a child unless the natural parent waives all parental rights") (em-
phasis added). But cf Patt, supra note 200, at 112 ("In most states, statutory language will not
expressly prohibit second parent adoptions."). Patt discusses in depth the interpretation and
implications of adoption statutes requiring termination of parental rights. Id. at 113-21. She
points out that the development of stepparent adoption in California was directly related to the
court's willingness to waive the requirements of California Civil Code § 229 (now § 221.76).
Id at 118. She reports that the state courts of California, Alaska, and Oregon have allowed
adoptions by the parent's same-sex partner. Id. at 98 n.13, 130-31. In making their decision,
the courts have emphasized the child's best interests, rather than the lack of a legal relation-
ship between the two women. Id at 131. See also CuRRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 10, at 7:39
("At least two states, ... Alaska and Oregon, have permitted the co-parent to adopt the child,
and two California judges have granted joint adoptions to lesbian couples.").
235. See Patt, supra note 200, at 96 (noting that when couples are unable or unwilling to
marry, their children lack legal protection, and that a legal alternative is necessary); Polikofi,
Legal Obstacles, supra note 200, at 911 n. 15 ("Lesbians cannot legally marry, and thus cannot
take advantage of the statutory provisions for stepparent adoption").
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In California, a few second parent adoptions have been granted,
although not under the express terminology of "second parent adop-
tion. '236 The courts have waived California Civil Code section 221.76
(formerly section 229),237 in certain circumstances, by focusing on the
child's best interests rather than the marital or legal status of the adopt-
ing couple.238 However, this waiver depends on the individual determi-
nation of the judge overseeing the adoption.239
This ad hoe method of waiving section 221.76 appears arbitrary and
may not promote consistent results. Enactment of a second parent adop-
tion statute in California allowing the nomnarital partner to adopt a
child without extinguishing the rights of the natural or adoptive parent
would be a more reliable alternative. One author, noting that the best
interests of the child "often come under biased scrutiny," has proposed
an amendment to the Model State Adoption Act to prevent judges from
denying the existence of second parent adoption for lack of legislative
authority.240 A similar amendment is necessary in California to prevent
courts from denying the existence of such adoptions for lack of legislative
authority and to ensure consistent and unbiased results.241
236. See In re N.L.D., No. 17945 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County, Feb. 24, 1986);
see also In re DJ.L., No. A-28345 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County, Apr. 17, 1984) (adop-
tion by unmarried heterosexual partner of the parent); Patt, supra note 200, at 98 & n.13
(citing In re N., No. 18086 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County, May 11, 1986) (adoption
by parent's same-sex partner)); Bashaw, supra note 200, at 325-26 & nn.18-27 (citing adoptions
in Oregon, Alaska, California and Washington); Zuckerman, supra note 200, at 741 n.66 (cit-
ing Alaska, New Jersey and Oregon second parent adoption cases).
237. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.76 (West 1991); supra note 236.
238. Patt, supra note 200, at 114-15 & n.111.
239. Further information regarding second parent adoption cases and criteria is not avail-
able for publication but is available for personal research from the National Center for Lesbian
Rights, 1370 Mission Street, Fourth Floor, San Francisco, California, 94102.
240. Elizabeth Zuckerman, in her comment, proposes a legislative amendment to the
Model State Adoption Act, which reads in pertinent part:
Any person may, according to the provisions of this Act, adopt his or her
nonmarital partner's child, without requiring the existing legal parent to relinquish
his or her rights and responsibilities, except that:
(a) Before the filing of the petition for adoption, the adoptee must have resided
for a period of one (1) year with petitioner, unless this filing provision is waived
by the court for good cause shown ....
Zuckerman, supra note 200, at 758 n.173.
241. In approaching this task, it must be remembered that "[n]o amendment can or should
deprive judges of their discretion in adoption proceedings. The best interests determination
must remain open-ended to protect parents and children from inflexible rules." Id. A second
parent adoption statute will not curtail the discretion of family law judges. It will, however,
prevent arbitrary discrimination against same-sex couples that results from the current prac-
tice of ad hoc waiver of § 221.76.
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IV. Conclusion
Because California's current statutory definition of the parent-child
relationship recognizes only natural and adoptive parents as legal par-
ents, the nonbiological or nonadoptive lesbian parent is restricted in two
ways. She is unable to pursue a child custody or visitation action because
she lacks standing. And were the legal parent to bring her into family
court, she still would be unable to seek parental rights on the same foot-
ing as the natural or adoptive parent. These statutory limitations lead to
an unfair result when the couple has mutually decided to raise a family
together prior to the birth of any children. Same-sex couples experience
another statutory barrier when, after the birth of a child by one, they
wish the other to legally adopt that child. In California, a nonmarital
partner currently is unable to adopt her partner's child without extin-
guishing the partner's rights as the natural or adoptive parent. Because
same-sex couples cannot legally marry in California, the statutory
scheme makes it impossible for these nonbiological and nonadoptive par-
ents to attain the status of legal parent of a child they have raised to-
gether with the biological mother since the child's birth.
Statutory redefinition of the parent-child relationship and the enact-
ment of a second parent adoption statute would provide nonbiological
parents in lesbian relationships with the legal recognition necessary to
protect the integrity of their families. Redefinition of the parent-child
relationship should include a narrowly tailored provision defining de
facto parenthood, and a method for establishing a de facto parent-child
relationship. Enactment of a second parent adoption statute would pro-
vide a legitimate method for partners in same-sex couples to adopt each
other's children without extinguishing the rights of the natural or adop-
tive parent. Working in combination, these two proposed statutes would
offer legal recognition to same-sex families and thereby allow both par-
ents to protect their relationship with their children.
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